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In sequential games of traditional game theory, backward induction guarantees existence of Nash equilibrium by
yielding a sub-game perfect equilibrium. But if payoffs range over a partially ordered set instead of the reals, then the
backward induction predicate does no longer imply the Nash equilibrium predicate. Non-determinism is a solution:
a suitable non-deterministic backward induction function returns a non-deterministic strategy profile which is a non-
deterministic Nash equilibrium. The main notions and results in this article are constructive, conceptually simple and
formalised in the proof assistant Coq.
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1 Introduction
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) described the basis of modern game theory. Then Nash (1950) intro-
duced his key notion of non-cooperative equilibrium. That concept referred to strategic games in the first
place, but is also relevant when studying games in extensive form, also called sequential games. An early
equilibrium existence proof is due to Zermelo (1912) for the game of Chess, which is a specific instance
of sequential game. Kuhn (1953) stated the existence of equilibrium for games in extensive form in 1953.
Vestergaard (2006) formalised this result with the theorem prover Coq, for binary game trees and payoffs
ranging over the naturals. The proof relies on a notion called backward induction in game theory and
introduced by Selten (1965) and Selten (1975). Game theory has been mostly studying real-valued pay-
offs games, although Blackwell (1956) generalised strategic games by replacing real-valued payoffs by
real-valued payoffs vectors. As a result, strategy profiles were no longer preference-wise totally ordered.
That lead to the definition and study of multi criteria games.
1.1 Issues and Contribution
As is clear from Vestergaard (2006), Kuhn’s argument relies on the domain of payoffs to be totally ordered.
The issue addressed here is what happens to Kuhn’s result and its formal proof when payoffs range over
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an arbitrary partial order. Note that considering partial orders is both an abstraction and a generalisation
over real-valued payoffs (vectors). An example shows that not all games have Nash equilibria under
the definitions of strategy and Nash equilibrium directly translated from the real-valued payoffs case.
Those classic definitions can be refined along Le Roux et al. (2006) so that there seems to be no simple
counter example to equilibrium existence. However an example shows that backward induction no longer
implies Nash equilibrium (which does not mean that there is no Nash equilibrium). It means that an
equilibrium-existence proof in the style of Vestergaard (2006) is not possible. I introduce the formal
notions of non-deterministic strategy and non-deterministic equilibrium, and define a non-deterministic
backward induction function. Then I prove constructively and formally with Coq that any sequential game
with partially ordered payoffs has a non-deterministic equilibrium.
1.2 This Article
Section 2 gives an overview of what would be the formalism from Vestergaard (2006) used with an arbi-
trary partial order. Section 3 shows that the definitions of Nash equilibrium and backward induction need
slight rephrasing at the logical level (as done in part by Le Roux et al. (2006)), and that the backward
induction predicate no longer guarantees the Nash equilibrium predicate. Section 4 formally introduces,
in the non-deterministic case, the notions of strategy and Nash equilibrium, and defines a backward induc-
tion function. The end of the section states and sketches the proof of equilibrium existence for sequential
games when payoffs range over an arbitrary partial order.
The content of this article is formalised in Coq. For the sake of simplicity only binary game trees are
involved. However, the result should hold for all games in extensive form. I mainly follow Vestergaard
(2006) and Le Roux et al. (2006) for notations and terminology.
2 Basic Definitions
Informally speaking, a game involves some players, also called agents. For each agent the set of possible
payoffs, also called outcomes, is (partially) ordered by a preference relation. A game in extensive form
is represented as a rooted tree with labelled nodes: internal nodes are labelled with an agent, and leaves
with a payoff function. A payoff function takes an agent and returns a payoff. The game starts at the root.
The agent owning the root chooses in which sub-tree the game will continue, and so on. When the play
reaches a leaf, payoffs are distributed and the game ends. Formally, games are defined by induction:
Definition 1 ((Binary) Game Trees, Payoff Function) Let A be a set of agents and let Payoffs be a set
of payoffs with a decidable order relation.
G ::= gL PF PF : A → Payoffs
| gN A G G
An example involving two agents a and b
gN a (gN b (a 7→ 1, b 7→ 0) (a 7→ 3, b 7→ 1)) (a 7→ 2, b 7→ 2)
and its graphical representation. The label A, B at a leaf means that a gets payoff A and b gets payoff B.
a
b 2, 2
1, 0 3, 1
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In order to play, agents follow strategies. Informally, a strategy for one agent amounts to a choice
being (pre-)made at each internal node owned by the agent. A strategy profile is a tuple of strategies, one
strategy per agent. A strategy profile amounts to a choice being (pre-)made at each internal node of the
game. Formally, choices and strategies are defined by induction:
Definition 2 ((Binary) Strategy profiles, Choices)
S ::= sL PF Choice ::= l | r
| sN A Choice S S
We let c range over Choice and write c for c-“opposite”: l, r, r, l.
Informally, the payoff function induced by a strategy profile is at the leaf that is reached by the play
following the “recommendation” of the strategy profile. Formally the induced payoff function is defined
by induction:
Definition 3 (Induced Payoff)
PO(sL po) , po
PO(sN a c sl sr) , PO(sc)
An Example of strategy profile using the previous game
sN a l (sN b l (a 7→ 1, b 7→ 0) (a 7→ 3, b 7→ 1)) (a 7→ 2, b 7→ 2)
and its graphical representation. Bold lines between nodes represent choices (pre-)made by the agents.
The induced payoff function of that strategy profile is: a gets 1 and b gets 0.
a
b 2, 2
1, 0 3, 1
Intuitively, when a strategy profile is given, an agent owning some nodes can change his strategy, e.g.,
go left instead of right in any node he owns. This leads to a change in the strategy profile. That is formally
captured by the following definition:






























For example, below, the agent b can convert the strategy profile on the left to the one on the right.
a a
b b b b
Informally, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile that no agent can convert to another strategy profile
strictly better for himself. Formally it is defined below, but not by induction:
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Definition 5 ((Sequential) Nash Equilibrium)
EqN(s) , ‘As′, a . s //
a
oo s′ ” => ” PO(s′)(a) ≤ PO(s)(a)
Backward induction is a predicate. Intuitively, it amounts to optimising choices (pre-)made at each
internal node of the game, when the options are comparable. Formally, it is defined by induction:
Definition 6 (Backward Induction)
BI(sL po)
BI(sl) BI(sr) PO(sc)(a) ≤ PO(sc)(a)
BI(sN a c sl sr)
Not all Nash equilibria are backward induction. For example the underlying game below has two Nash
equilibria. Only the one to the left is backward induction but both are Nash equilibria.
a a
b 2, 2 b 2, 2
1, 0 3, 1 1, 0 3, 1
Note that in the total-order case, backward induction implies Nash equilibrium, as proved by Vester-
gaard (2006). However, Subsection 3.2 shows that this does not hold in the partial-order case.
3 Problems
3.1 First Problem
According to the current definitions of equilibrium and backward induction, not all games (in the partial
order case) have equilibria and the backward induction predicate is empty. This happens in the following
example where the agent a plays alone and x and y are two outcomes that are not comparable. Indeed,
none of the two possible strategies would be explicitly better than or even equivalent to the other one.
a
x y
The above “problem” (one usually expects that equilibrium exists) has a solution: the intuition behind
the notion of equilibrium is that an agent cannot get something explicitly better by changing his mind,
not that what he would get is explicitly worse or equal (for an discussion on this topic, see Le Roux et al.
(2006)). The two concepts lead to equivalent predicates for total orders but not for partial orders. Hence
the two definitions of equilibrium and backward induction can be slightly changed to:
EqN(s) , ‘As′, a . s //
a
oo s′ ” => ” ¬(PO(s)(a) < PO(s′)(a))
BI(sL po)
BI(sl) BI(sr) ¬(PO(sc)(a) < PO(sc)(a))
BI(sN a c sl sr)
The re-definitions above can actually be seen as a refinement of the two notions. Now it would be
possible to guarantee that the backward induction predicate is not empty. However the question would be:
Is the proof of Vestergaard (2006) still a proof for the existence of equilibrium in the partial-order case?
Put otherwise, does the backward induction predicate still guarantee the Nash equilibrium predicate?
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3.2 Second Problem
The answer to the last question above is negative due to the following example where the agent a plays
alone and the only comparison between x, y, and z is z ≤ x. The strategy profile below is a backward




It implies that although an equilibrium may exist, the proof cannot have the same structure as for the
total-order case. There are two main ways to continue: either change proofs, or change definitions. For
now, let see why it is reasonable to consider changing the definitions so that the proof does not need to
change to much in spirit. Nash encountered the same kind of problem when dealing with strategic games:
not all of those games had an equilibrium. So Nash (1950) introduced probabilities into the definitions of
strategy and equilibrium, so that he could guarantee existence of (probabilistic) equilibrium. The essence
of Nash’s construction is explained by Le Roux et al. (2006). Similarly, the Nash-like construction of
Section 4 will cope with the partial order issue.
4 Non-Deterministic Strategies
According to the current definition, a strategy profile amounts to exactly one sub-game tree being chosen
at each node of the game tree. The underlying strategies are therefore implicitly deterministic. The notion
of non-deterministic strategy will generalise the one of strategy and guarantee equilibrium existence. The
non-determinism used here is explicit and discrete. The discreteness guarantees that finite games gener-
ate finite sets of strategies, which has a computational advantage. As for Nash’s probability construction
for finite strategic games, the non-determinism is induced by probabilities and is therefore “continuous”.
So, in Nash’s case, finite games generate infinite sets of strategies. Subsection 4.1 implements an ex-
plicit and discrete non-determinism in sequential games and sketches the proof of non-deterministic Nash
equilibrium existence that has been formalised in Coq. Subsection 4.2 gives examples.
4.1 Formal Development
The explicit and discrete non-determinism is implemented this way: game trees need not be changed.
Strategy profiles need changing. In order to be as simple as possible, the non-determinism of a choice
among some options will be represented by a non empty subset of the options. In this article, the possible
choices were left and right before. Now they are left, right or both.
Inductive Choice : Set := l — r — b.
The only change in the definition of strategy profiles comes from the change in the definition of choice:
Inductive NDS : Type :=
— sL : PayoffF → NDS
— sN : Agent → Choice → NDS → NDS → NDS.
Before, any strategy profile would induce a payoff. Now a strategy profile yields a non empty set of
possible payoffs to each agent. This “set” is represented by a list in Coq mainly because the axioms of
82 Ste´phane Le Roux
set theory are not needed. The non-deterministic payoff function below expects a strategy profile and an
agent as arguments. The keyword “struct” in the Coq code below means that the function is defined by
structural recursion (on its argument s). The symbol ++ means list concatenation (set union).
Fixpoint NDPayoff (s : NDS)(a : Agent){struct s} : list Payoff :=
match s with
— sL p ⇒ (p a)::nil
— sN a’ c sl sr ⇒ match c with
— l ⇒ (NDPayoff sl a)
— r ⇒ (NDPayoff sr a)
— b ⇒ (NDPayoff sl a)++(NDPayoff sr a)
end
end.
In order to keep the essence of the definitions of Nash equilibrium and backward induction, two strate-
gies need comparing through their induced set of possible outcomes. Here the preference relation is
transitive and irreflexive. Transitivity reflects agents being consistent and aware at a global level. Irreflex-
ivity means that nothing is strictly better than itself. Now we discuss the way to define a comparison
among sets or lists. Informally, a set A of outcomes is better than a set B if whatever outcome non-
deterministically chosen in A and whatever outcome non-deterministically chosen in B, the one from A
is always better than or equivalent to the one from B, and sometimes it is strictly better. In the formal
proof, I do not use set theory. The notion of list is enough and seems to be more practical: it uses fewer
libraries, it is constructive, it does not require the extensionality axiom from set theory, and the inductive
proof principle is always available. However I may sometimes use the word of set in an informal meaning.
In the following definition, AllLe l l’ means that any element of the list l is less than or equal to any
element of the list l’, w.r.t. the relation partially ordering the payoffs. And SomeLt l l’ means that some
element in l is strictly less than some element in l’. The predicate PrefL compares lists and the predicate
PrefS compares strategy profiles.
Definition PrefL (l l’ : list Payoff ) : Prop := SomeLt l l’ ∧ AllLe l l’.
Definition PrefS (a : Agent)(s1 s2 : NDS) : Prop :=
PrefL (NDPayoff s1 a)(NDPayoff s2 a).
The two independent following remarks are worth noting in order to get a intuition of the preference
relation: first, if an element of a set and another element of another set are not comparable then the two
sets should not be comparable. Second, the two sets {0, 2} and {3, 1}, for example, are not comparable.
The agent-convertibility is the “natural” generalisation of the deterministic one. The definition of Nash
equilibrium is conceptually the same as before:
Definition NDEq (s : NDS) : Prop :=
∀ a, ∀ s’, NDAgentConv a s s’ → ¬PrefS a s s’.
It would be possible to define a backward induction predicate. The definition would change slightly to
take the non-determinism into account, but the backward induction spirit would still be present. However,
the example of Subsection 3.2 would still mean that non-deterministic backward induction does not im-
ply non-deterministic Nash equilibrium. So, a proof of existence of non-deterministic Nash equilibrium
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cannot follow Vestergaard (2006). Instead I define a non-deterministic backward induction function and
prove directly that it is a non-deterministic Nash equilibrium. Informally, the function is defined as fol-
low: three cases can occur at a node: left is better than right, right is better than left, or left and right are
not comparable (the case left better than right and right better than left is impossible by transitivity and
irreflexivity). If one option is better than the other one then the agent chooses that better option. If the
two options are not comparable then the agent non-deterministically chooses the two options via the key-
word “both”. For arbitrary (non binary) games, the agent non-deterministically chooses all the maximal
options. In the inductive definition below, PrefS dec means that PrefS is decidable and that a case
splitting is performed. When reading the syntax as pseudo code, PrefS dec can be informally replaced
by PrefS:
Fixpoint NDBIF (g : Game) : NDS :=
match g with
— gL pf ⇒ sL pf
— gN a gl gr ⇒
let sl := NDBIF gl in let sr := NDBIF gr in
let c:=
(if (PrefS dec a sl sr) then r else
if (PrefS dec a sr sl) then l else b)
in
sN a c sl sr
end.
Before stating the theorem I need to define a function that takes a strategy profile and retrieves the game
the strategy profile is built on. It amounts to deleting the choices in a strategy profile.
Fixpoint nds2g (s : NDS) : Game :=
match s with
— sL pf ⇒ gL pf
— sN a c sl sr ⇒ gN a (nds2g sl)(nds2g sr)
end.
Now we can state the theorem:
Theorem Equilibrium constructive existence :
∀ g : Game, nds2g (NDBIF g)=g ∧ NDEq (NDBIF g).
Both conjuncts are proved by induction. The first one and the leaf case of the second one are straight-
forward. The node case of the second requires a few lemmas on the preference relation PrefS. It proceeds
by case splitting on that relation w.r.t. the two sub-strategy profiles. Three cases out of four need a sub-
case splitting on the choice. The most difficult case occurs when the two sub-strategy profiles are not
comparable.
4.2 Example
In the following example, the sequential game involves two agents a and b. The set of payoffs is the set of
the finite subsets of the naturals. A singleton {n} is represented by the number n alone. At a leaf the label
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A, B means that agent a gets a payoff A and that agent b gets a payoff B. In a strategy profile, choices
are represented by bold lines between nodes. Here is the non-deterministic backward induction.
a
b b
1, {0, 2} 0, {1, 3, 4} 0, 1 {0, 1}, 0
So, a play of the game according to the non-deterministic backward induction function will result in
a choosing left, then b non-deterministically choosing left or right. In addition, the non-deterministic
backward induction function may be of interest beyond its technical use in the proof. Compare the two
games and non-deterministic backward inductions below:
a a
b 3, 2 {3, 4}, 0 3, 2
3, 0 4, 0
Informally, the game to the right is actually the way agent a sees the game to the left in a non-
cooperative setting and when at the root of the game tree: if a goes to the right he will get 3. If he
goes to the left he will get either 3 or 4 (but has no clue how b is going to choose). This suggests that
sequential games over partial orders are relevant even when dealing with traditional sequential games. In
particular, the non-deterministic backward induction function may help recommend players how to play.
5 Conclusion and future work
Game theory usually considers real-valued payoffs. This article considers partially ordered payoff do-
mains for sequential games. Game theory usually considers non-determinism as a consequence of prob-
abilities. This article considers an explicit, i.e., direct and intensional, non-determinism. That non-
determinism is introduced to solve the issue raised by the partial ordering. That issue is: if the payoff
domain is partially ordered, do Kuhn’s result and its formal proof still hold? An example shows that with
the traditional definition of Nash equilibrium, not all sequential games have Nash equilibria. Refining the
definitions along Le Roux et al. (2006) is an improvement since there is no simple counter example to
Nash equilibrium existence. However, it does not lead to an existence proof in the style of Vestergaard
(2006). Indeed an example shows that backward induction does not imply Nash equilibrium, which is
needed for that specific proof. Then, Section 4 introduces the formal notions of non-deterministic choice,
strategy, and equilibrium. Those notions still permit examples where backward induction does not imply
Nash equilibrium, therefore an equilibrium-existence result cannot be proved along the proof of Vester-
gaard (2006) in the partial-order/non-deterministic case. However, the setting allows the definition of a
backward induction function that takes any game and returns a non-deterministic strategy which is both
backward induction and Nash equilibrium for the game. This construction leads to a general adaptation
of Kuhn’s result keeping almost the same overall proof structure. This construction is an instance of what
is called along Le Roux et al. (2006) a Nash-like construction. It is worth stressing that all the technical
development was formalised with the proof assistant Coq.
This article can lead to at least three other research topics. 1) The spirit of backward induction having
been kept to some extent, it is reasonable to wonder whether the results involving backward induction
in traditional game theory can be easily generalised to the partial-order/non-deterministic case. 2) An
example shows that even with a refined deterministic definition equilibrium, the proof of Kuhn’s result
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does not hold. But does the result itself hold? Said otherwise: has any sequential game with partially
ordered payoff domain a (deterministic) Nash equilibrium? 3) The explicit and discrete non-determinism
has been successfully used for sequential games. Could it lead to a non-deterministic notion of strategy
and a simple proof of equilibrium for strategic games?
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